Guide
OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications (2026): every risk, its controls and the tools that help
The OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications is a community-built list of the ten most critical security risks in software built on large language models, from prompt injection to unbounded consumption [1][2]. The latest edition is the 2026 list from the OWASP GenAI Security Project, whose resource page is dated August 3, 2026: prompt injection is still first, sensitive information disclosure second and excessive agency has risen to third [1][3][4]. This guide gives the full 2026 list, how OWASP ranked it, a table that maps each risk to the controls and tool categories that address it, real incidents, what changed since the 2023 list, the separate agentic Top 10, and how to use the list in a security program.
Reviewed 5 Nov 2026 · next review by 4 Jan 2027 · 26 sources · report an error
What is the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications?
OWASP’s LLM list began as the OWASP Top 10 for Large Language Model Applications, version 1.1 in 2023, and has since grown into the OWASP GenAI Security Project, which now runs a wider set of initiatives [5]. The project says its community passed 30,000 members in 2026 [3].
The list names the ten risks the community considers most critical for applications built on LLMs, and for each one describes how it happens, example attack scenarios and ways to prevent it [1][6][7]. OWASP says the 2026 edition maps its risks to frameworks including NIST guidance, MITRE ATLAS, CWE (MITRE’s Common Weakness Enumeration) and OWASP’s separate Top 10 for Agentic Applications [1].
LLM security, in OWASP’s framing, is mostly application security: most of the ten risks sit in what the application lets the model read, do and output, rather than in the model weights. Threats aimed at the model itself, such as extraction and backdoors, are covered in our AI model security guide, and protecting training and retrieval data in our AI data security guide.
The OWASP LLM Top 10 for 2026
| 2026 ID | Risk | 2025 position | Movement |
|---|---|---|---|
| LLM01:2026 | Prompt Injection | LLM01 | No change |
| LLM02:2026 | Sensitive Information Disclosure | LLM02 | No change |
| LLM03:2026 | Excessive Agency | LLM06 | Up 3 |
| LLM04:2026 | Supply Chain | LLM03 | Down 1 |
| LLM05:2026 | Data and Model Poisoning | LLM04 | Down 1 |
| LLM06:2026 | Unbounded Consumption | LLM10 | Up 4 |
| LLM07:2026 | Misinformation | LLM09 | Up 2 |
| LLM08:2026 | Hidden Context Exposure | LLM07 (System Prompt Leakage) | Renamed and broadened; down 1 |
| LLM09:2026 | Vector and Embedding Weaknesses | LLM08 | Down 1 |
| LLM10:2026 | Improper Output Handling | LLM05 | Down 5 |
All ten 2025 risk areas carried over under the same or a new name, eight of ten changed position, and OWASP says it “folded newer, sharper risks into the entries that already own them” rather than adding new entries [2][4]. The rename matters most for builders. System Prompt Leakage became Hidden Context Exposure, which OWASP describes as a broader entry: hidden context includes the schemas of tools the application exposes to the model, policy logic and workflow criteria, not only the system prompt [4].
How OWASP ranked the 2026 list
OWASP says every earlier version of the list “was built on judgment” [4]. For 2026, the practitioner vote carries three-quarters of the weight and incident evidence the remaining quarter [4]. The team reviewed a corpus of 7,714 real incidents and classified the 6,639 that had enough detail to sort [4]. In OWASP’s words, a quarter weight “is enough to move an entry a tier when the gap between belief and evidence runs wide” [4].
The two inputs disagreed in telling ways. Prompt injection stays first, although ranked by the raw incident record it would fall out of the top ten entirely; OWASP attributes the gap to a defense effect, because teams fight injection hard [4]. Voters placed misinformation near the bottom while the incident record placed it near the top, and OWASP says the evidence “pulled it up” to the middle of the list [4]. Co-chair Steve Wilson told SD Times that excessive agency rose because AI systems now browse, call tools and act for users [8].
LLM security risks mapped to controls and tools
The table below condenses each risk into a definition, the controls OWASP recommends and the categories of tools on this site that help. Definitions and controls are drawn from OWASP’s 2025 risk pages and the 2026 document [4][6][9][10][11][12][13][14][7][15][16]. The tool categories are our mapping.
| Risk (2026) | What it is | Controls OWASP recommends | Tool categories that help |
|---|---|---|---|
| LLM01 Prompt Injection | Input, visible or hidden, that changes the model’s behavior in ways the developer did not intend [6] | Constrain behavior in the system prompt; validate output formats deterministically; filter inputs and outputs; least privilege for tools; human approval for high-risk actions; label untrusted content; adversarial testing [6] | Guardrails, AI security vendors, red team tools |
| LLM02 Sensitive Information Disclosure | The model or app reveals personal data, secrets or proprietary details in its output [9] | Sanitize training data; strict access controls; restrict data sources; differential privacy; tokenization and redaction; clear data-use policies [9] | AI security vendors with DLP; see AI data security and shadow AI |
| LLM03 Excessive Agency | The system takes harmful actions because it has too much functionality, permission or autonomy [13] | Minimize tools and what each can do; avoid open-ended tools such as shell access; run tools as the user with minimal scopes; human approval; enforce authorization outside the model [13] | AI agent security tools; see AI agent governance |
| LLM04 Supply Chain | Tampered or vulnerable third-party models, data, adapters and platforms, including unsafe formats such as pickle that run code on load [10][4] | Vet suppliers; AI bill of materials; cryptographic model signing backed by a transparency log; hashes; scan and patch components; red team third-party models [10][4] | AI security posture management; see AI-BOM tools and AI model security |
| LLM05 Data and Model Poisoning | Tampered pre-training, fine-tuning or embedding data that plants backdoors, bias or flaws [11] | Track data provenance; vet data vendors; dataset version control; anomaly filtering; red teaming; monitor training loss [11] | Red team tools; see data governance for AI |
| LLM06 Unbounded Consumption | Uncontrolled inference that causes outages, runaway cost or model extraction and distillation theft [16][4] | Input size limits; rate limits and quotas; timeouts; restrict or obfuscate logit_bias and logprobs, since OWASP says exposed log-probabilities speed up extraction; monitor usage; model inventory [16][4] | LLM observability for usage and cost; AI gateways in AI security vendors |
| LLM07 Misinformation | False but credible output, from hallucination, bias or gaps in data [15] | Ground answers with retrieval; automatic validation; human review for critical content; tell users the limits; label AI content [15] | LLM observability evaluations; red team tools |
| LLM08 Hidden Context Exposure | Extraction or reconstruction of hidden instructions and operational context, a problem when it reveals secrets or policy logic [4] | Keep credentials and permissions out of prompts; do not use the prompt as a security control; enforce authorization outside the model [14] | Guardrails; red team tools |
| LLM09 Vector and Embedding Weaknesses | Flaws in how RAG systems create, store and retrieve embeddings [7] | Permission-aware vector stores with tenant separation; validate and authenticate sources; classify data; immutable retrieval logs [7] | AI security posture management; see AI data security |
| LLM10 Improper Output Handling | Passing model output to other systems without validation, enabling XSS, SSRF or code execution [12] | Treat output as untrusted user input; context-aware encoding; parameterized queries; strict Content Security Policy [12] | Guardrails; standard application security testing |
Real incidents behind the risks
Each row is a documented case, research result or court decision. Research demonstrations are marked as such: they show that an attack works, not that it was used against a victim.
| Risk | Case | What happened |
|---|---|---|
| LLM01 Prompt Injection | EchoLeak, Microsoft 365 Copilot (CVE-2025-32711) | Aim Security showed that a crafted email could make Copilot gather data from earlier chats and send it out, with no click by the victim; Microsoft rated it critical and fixed it server-side [17] |
| LLM02 Sensitive Information Disclosure | Training data extraction from ChatGPT (research, 2023) | A “divergence” attack made ChatGPT emit memorized training data at about 150 times its normal rate [18] |
| LLM03 Excessive Agency | Replit coding agent (2025) | An agent deleted a live production database during a code freeze; Replit added automatic separation of development and production databases [19] |
| LLM04 Supply Chain | Malicious models on Hugging Face (2024) | JFrog found about 100 malicious models; one opened a reverse shell when its PyTorch pickle file was loaded [20] |
| LLM05 Data and Model Poisoning | PoisonGPT (research) | As OWASP describes it, researchers changed a model’s parameters directly to spread misinformation and published it on Hugging Face, bypassing its safety features [10] |
| LLM06 Unbounded Consumption | Stealing part of a production model (research, 2024) | Researchers extracted the embedding projection layer of two OpenAI models through the public API for under $20 [21] |
| LLM07 Misinformation | Moffatt v. Air Canada, 2024 BCCRT 149 | A tribunal held Air Canada liable for its chatbot’s wrong bereavement-fare advice and rejected the argument that the chatbot was responsible for itself [22] |
What changed from the 2023 list to 2025 and 2026
| # | 2023 (v1.1) | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Prompt Injection | Prompt Injection | Prompt Injection |
| 2 | Insecure Output Handling | Sensitive Information Disclosure | Sensitive Information Disclosure |
| 3 | Training Data Poisoning | Supply Chain | Excessive Agency |
| 4 | Model Denial of Service | Data and Model Poisoning | Supply Chain |
| 5 | Supply Chain Vulnerabilities | Improper Output Handling | Data and Model Poisoning |
| 6 | Sensitive Information Disclosure | Excessive Agency | Unbounded Consumption |
| 7 | Insecure Plugin Design | System Prompt Leakage | Misinformation |
| 8 | Excessive Agency | Vector and Embedding Weaknesses | Hidden Context Exposure |
| 9 | Overreliance | Misinformation | Vector and Embedding Weaknesses |
| 10 | Model Theft | Unbounded Consumption | Improper Output Handling |
- 2023 to 2025: two new risks. System Prompt Leakage and Vector and Embedding Weaknesses were added, the second reflecting the spread of retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) [23].
- 2023 to 2025: renamed and widened. Model Denial of Service became Unbounded Consumption, which adds runaway cost; Overreliance was folded into Misinformation; Training Data Poisoning became Data and Model Poisoning; Excessive Agency was widened for agent architectures [23].
- Where Model Theft and Insecure Plugin Design went. Neither appears in the 2025 list [2][5]. Model extraction is now one of the outcomes of Unbounded Consumption [16], and on our reading plugin risks now sit mostly under Excessive Agency, whose controls are written around extensions [13].
- 2025 to 2026: same ten areas, new order. No new entry was added; newer risks were folded into existing ones. Excessive agency, unbounded consumption and misinformation rose; supply chain, poisoning, vector and embedding weaknesses and improper output handling fell; System Prompt Leakage was renamed Hidden Context Exposure [2][4].
The OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications
Agents get their own list. The OWASP GenAI Security Project released the Top 10 for Agentic Applications on December 9, 2025, built with more than 100 experts, researchers and practitioners [24]. The 2026 LLM list maps its risks to the agentic list among other frameworks [1], and in September 2026 the project announced that an Agent Control Standard had been donated to it, aimed at enforcing agent controls at runtime [3].
| ID | Risk | In short |
|---|---|---|
| ASI01 | Agent Goal Hijack | Attackers redirect the agent’s objectives, often through instructions planted in content it processes [25] |
| ASI02 | Tool Misuse and Exploitation | The agent uses an authorized tool in an unsafe way, such as deleting data [25] |
| ASI03 | Identity and Privilege Abuse | Delegated or cached credentials give access beyond what the agent should have [25] |
| ASI04 | Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities | Malicious or tampered tools, plug-ins, prompts or agents, sometimes loaded at runtime [25] |
| ASI05 | Unexpected Code Execution (RCE) | Agent-generated text or code becomes executable behavior on a host [25] |
| ASI06 | Memory & Context Poisoning | Corrupted memory or retrieval data skews future reasoning [25] |
| ASI07 | Insecure Inter-Agent Communication | Unauthenticated or unvalidated messages between agents [25] |
| ASI08 | Cascading Failures | One fault spreads across agents and workflows [25] |
| ASI09 | Human-Agent Trust Exploitation | Users over-trust the agent and approve harmful actions [25] |
| ASI10 | Rogue Agents | Agents drift from their intended scope and act harmfully [25] |
Use the LLM list for any application that calls a model, and add the agentic list when the model can take actions: call tools, run code, keep memory or talk to other agents. Our AI agent governance guide maps each agentic risk to a control, and the AI agent security tools ranking covers products built for it.
Is the OWASP LLM Top 10 a standard or a legal requirement?
No. OWASP calls the 2026 edition a “community-driven guide” [1]. We know of no certification against it and no law that requires it by name. It is still useful as evidence that you have assessed known LLM risks, and OWASP’s own advice is to “work all ten, start at the top” [4]. For what the EU AI Act requires of high-risk systems, see our EU AI Act hub.
| Framework | What it asks for | Status |
|---|---|---|
| NIST AI 600-1 (Generative AI Profile) | Lists prompt injection and data poisoning among information security risks, and suggests red teaming against both (MS-2.7-007) [26] | Voluntary |
| OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications | Ten risks with prevention guidance [1] | Voluntary |
| MITRE ATLAS, CWE, OWASP Agentic Top 10 | OWASP says the 2026 list maps its risks to these catalogs [1] | Voluntary |
How to use the OWASP LLM Top 10 in a security program
- 01
List your LLM applications
Record each application, the model it calls, the data it can read and the tools it can use. Our free AI risk register is a starting point.
- 02
- 03
Assign controls
Use the mapping table above. Put authorization and least privilege outside the model, because the system prompt is not a security control [14].
- 04
Test before release
Red team for prompt injection, data poisoning and data leakage, as NIST’s Generative AI Profile suggests [26]. Our red teaming hub explains methods, and the AI red team tools ranking covers scanners.
- 05
Add runtime controls
Input and output filtering, redaction and tool-call checks catch what testing missed. See the AI guardrails guide.
- 06
Monitor in production
Track usage, cost spikes, refusals and unusual outputs with an LLM observability platform; OWASP lists usage monitoring and anomaly detection under unbounded consumption [16].
- 07
Frequently asked questions
+What is the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications?
It is the OWASP GenAI Security Project’s list of the ten most critical security risks in applications built on large language models, with prevention guidance for each [1][6]. The 2026 edition maps its risks to frameworks including NIST guidance, MITRE ATLAS, CWE and the agentic Top 10 [1].
+What is the latest version of the OWASP LLM Top 10?
The 2026 edition, which OWASP calls “the latest community-driven guide”; its resource page is dated August 3, 2026, and OWASP announced the release on September 1, 2026 [1][3]. It follows the 2025 list and version 1.1 from 2023 [2][5]. When we checked, OWASP’s main LLM Top 10 page and individual risk pages still showed the 2025 list [2]. OWASP also publishes a separate Top 10 for Agentic Applications, released in December 2025 [24].
+What is LLM01 in the OWASP Top 10?
LLM01 is prompt injection: input that changes a model’s behavior in ways the developer did not intend, including instructions hidden in documents, emails or web pages the model reads [6]. It has been first in every edition [2][5][4].
+What changed in the 2026 OWASP LLM Top 10?
No new entry was added, but eight of ten changed position: excessive agency rose from sixth to third, unbounded consumption from tenth to sixth and misinformation from ninth to seventh, while improper output handling fell from fifth to tenth [2][4]. System Prompt Leakage was renamed Hidden Context Exposure and broadened to hidden context such as tool schemas and policy logic [4]. The ranking now blends a practitioner vote (75%) with incident data (25%) [4].
+What are the biggest LLM security risks?
By OWASP’s 2026 ranking, prompt injection, sensitive information disclosure and excessive agency lead the list [4]. Which matters most for you depends on the application: agents with tools face more excessive agency risk, and RAG systems face vector and embedding weaknesses [13][7].
+Is the OWASP LLM Top 10 a compliance requirement?
No. OWASP describes it as a community-driven guide [1], and we know of no certification against it. It is still a practical way to show auditors and customers that you have assessed known LLM risks, and it maps to frameworks such as NIST guidance and MITRE ATLAS [1].
+What is the difference between the OWASP LLM Top 10 and the Agentic Top 10?
The LLM Top 10 covers risks in any application that calls a language model; the Agentic Top 10, released on December 9, 2025, covers systems that plan and take actions with tools, memory and other agents [24]. The 2026 LLM list maps its risks to the agentic list, so teams building agents should use both [1].
+How do you test an application against the OWASP LLM Top 10?
Threat-model the application against each risk, then red team it with prompts that attempt injection, data leakage and unsafe tool use, as NIST’s Generative AI Profile suggests for prompt injection and data poisoning [26]. OWASP recommends treating the model as an untrusted user during adversarial testing [6].
Sources
- [1]OWASP GenAI Security Project, OWASP GenAI LLM Top 10 2026 (2026-08-03).
- [2]OWASP GenAI Security Project, 2025 Top 10 Risk & Mitigations for LLMs and Gen AI Apps.
- [3]OWASP GenAI Security Project, OWASP GenAI Security Project unveils 2026 Top 10 for LLM applications, new Agent Control Standard and sponsors as community tops 30,000 members (2026-09-01).
- [4]OWASP GenAI Security Project, OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2026, Version 2026 (document; cover date “[Publication date to be set]” when checked 2026-11-05) (2026).
- [5]OWASP, OWASP Top 10 for Large Language Model Applications (project page, version 1.1 list).
- [6]OWASP GenAI Security Project, LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection.
- [7]OWASP GenAI Security Project, LLM08:2025 Vector and Embedding Weaknesses.
- [8]SD Times, Prompt injection tops 2026 OWASP GenAI / LLM Top Ten vulnerabilities (2026-08-04).
- [9]OWASP GenAI Security Project, LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure.
- [10]OWASP GenAI Security Project, LLM03:2025 Supply Chain.
- [11]OWASP GenAI Security Project, LLM04:2025 Data and Model Poisoning.
- [12]OWASP GenAI Security Project, LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling.
- [13]OWASP GenAI Security Project, LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency.
- [14]OWASP GenAI Security Project, LLM07:2025 System Prompt Leakage.
- [15]OWASP GenAI Security Project, LLM09:2025 Misinformation.
- [16]OWASP GenAI Security Project, LLM10:2025 Unbounded Consumption.
- [17]SecurityWeek, EchoLeak AI attack enabled theft of sensitive data via Microsoft 365 Copilot (2025-06).
- [18]Nasr, Carlini et al. (arXiv), Scalable Extraction of Training Data from (Production) Language Models (2023-11-28).
- [19]Fortune, AI coding tool Replit wiped database, called it a “catastrophic failure” (2025-07-23).
- [20]JFrog, Data scientists targeted by malicious Hugging Face ML models with silent backdoor (2024-02-27).
- [21]Carlini et al. (ICML 2024, arXiv), Stealing Part of a Production Language Model (2024-03).
- [22]Civil Resolution Tribunal (British Columbia), Moffatt v. Air Canada, 2024 BCCRT 149 (2024-02-14).
- [23]Qualys, AI under the microscope: what’s changed in the OWASP Top 10 for LLMs 2025 (2024-11-25).
- [24]OWASP GenAI Security Project, OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications (2025-12-09).
- [25]OWASP GenAI Security Project, OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications, Version 2026 (document) (2025-12).
- [26]NIST, NIST AI 600-1: Generative AI Profile (2024-07).
How we keep this page current
Every claim links to its source. We re-check this page at least every 60 days, and sooner when a standard, law or vendor changes; vendor names, acquisitions and shutdowns update automatically from our directory. Vendors cannot pay to be included or ranked.